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Zusammenfassung:  
Like every other human being, scientists also have to allocate their scarce resources of time 
and production according to their personal preferences. Today’s scientific system is domina-
ted by different (external) incentives that influence a researcher’s decisions. With respect to 
the individual research strategy, there seems to be a conflict between scientific rigor and prac-
tical relevance. In addition, only certain scientific results actually find their way into the ge-
neral public. We assume therefore that the use of virological and economic expertise are two 
different forms of reception of science by another social sphere. If our assumption is correct, 
the question arises as to how such rules of reception are formed and stabilized. This question 
will be investigated in the present paper. With regard to his or her publication strategy, the 
scientist therefore has to decide interdependently. Based on the economic approach in general, 
and Gary S. Becker’s theory of time allocation specifically, we develop a simple model to ex-
plain scientific decision-making behavior. We derive several implications with regard to a 
strategy on time allocation in research processes, and thus contribute to a better understanding 
of scientific decision-making processes. In our paper, we concentrate on the general 
conditions in (business) economics, but the findings can also be applied to other (human) 
sciences. In order to be as up-to-date as possible, we take an additional look at the role of 

















Periodically, the “Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwick-
lung” (German Council of Economic Experts), colloquially referred to as “Wirtschaftsweisen” 
(“Wise Men of the Economy”), presents an annual economic report and comments on several 
current economic aspects. The reception of the recommendations of the collective, as well as 
those of other advisory bodies (e.g. ifo, ZEW, DIW, etc.) operating in the (macro-)economic 
context, appears to be rather low (Rürup 2009). In addition, “the relationship between top-level 
research and policy advice among German economists seems to be more substitutive than com-
plementary” (Haucap and Mödl 2013). 
This makes it all the more astonishing that political decision-makers in the so-called “COVID-
19 crisis” are dealing with scientific expertise from the point of view of economists. Beyond 
the question of whether or not the recommendations for action that were made by the virologists 
advising politicians were appropriate to manage the pandemic, all political decision-makers 
relied on the scientific expertise, especially from the medical sciences, in their daily political 
activities. The reference to the exceptional situation as the cause falls short of the mark, because 
the economic consequences of political action are to be mitigated by programs which econo-
mists were essentially only able to comment on after their adoption.  
Although the climate issue is hardly noticed in these times, at least in the media, similar things 
could also be observed in this context. While politicians, under increasing pressure from NGOs 
and activists, have been referring to a “consensus” among climate researchers in their measures 
for a few years, the economic side of the coin, which has already been worked on for decades 
in the context of environmental economics in general (starting with Pigou 1920; Coase 1960; 
Ostrom 1990; Nordhaus 1991; Frey 1993; Endres 2013) and the pricing of externalities and 
climate change in particular (early Nordhaus and Popp 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer 2000), has 
been largely ignored. The topic was not only recognized in economics, but its implementation 
in the practical business sphere was also put on the agenda early on by business economics (e.g. 
Balderjahn 2007).  
No discipline can claim to have the only valid recipe for solving modern problems. The human 
being and the interaction with his or her environment are too complex for that. In the context 
of the current pandemic, the virologist Alexander Kekulé and the economist Jens Südekum 
(2020) show that different perspectives from different disciplines are required for the political 
treatment of complex phenomena: while virological expertise is directly translated into political 
action, economic decisions are preferably developed directly from the political arena in its in-
teraction between executive and administrative bodies (Downs 1957; Niskanen 1975). 
The current COVID-19 pandemic and the different perception of scientist let us assume that 
public and political perception could have a significant influence on a scientist's strategic deci-
sions. Like every individual a scientist decides under uncertainty and is limited by scarce re-
sources and time budget. To contribute to the topic of the economics of science we would like 





rameters influencing the research strategy of a stereotypical utility-maximizing scientist. In ad-
dition to the public and political perception already mentioned, it is in particular the decision 
between rigor and relevance which is relevant for decision-making. The scientist is thus faced 
with the decision to allocate his scarce resources to the various determinants according to his 
individual preferences in such a way that his utility is maximized.  
If our assumption, that the use of virological and economic expertise are two different forms of 
reception of science by another social sphere, is correct, the question arises as to how such 
collective rules of reception are formed and stabilized. This question will be investigated in the 
present paper. Our goal is to propose an explanatory model which can be empirically tested in 
future research.  
Our model is based on the fundamental economic assumptions of methodological individualism 
and utility maximization (section 2), differentiates between the expected utility from rigor ver-
sus relevance against the background of the anticipated and experienced selection criteria of 
media, public and politics over time (section 3) and implies the retroactive effect of the degree 
of attention gained on the decisions considered in the model (section 4). The paper concludes 
with an outlook on further research (section 5). 
 
2 Basic Assumptions:  
Methodological Individualism and Utility Maximization  
In the following we will present two crucial assumptions of our analysis. This seems to be 
important in two respects: First, they are the basis of our model and are important for its inter-
pretation. Secondly, it is necessary for the interested public to recognize that scientists are in-
dividuals who – like other people as well – pursue their own interests. 
The principle of methodological individualism founded by Joseph Schumpeter (1998) applies 
both to human action in general, and to the process of scientific knowledge in particular. Ac-
cording to this conception, individuals always act individually, whereas collectives do not act 
autonomously. This idea applies to states and organizations, and also to the scientific commu-
nity. Thus, research is only carried out by individuals, not by an institution as a whole. However, 
it can be argued that scientists at public institutions tend to be oriented towards the common 
good, should such a thing exist despite Arrow’s (1951) impossibility theorem, but it is more 
likely to assume that scientists, just like other people (and this also applies to judges; Follert 
2020), are (also) interested in their own well-being, and are thus influenced by incentives in 
their decisions ( e.g. Emrich and Pitsch 2014; Emrich and Follert 2019a). This is without prej-
udice to the fact that altruistic action can also serve one's own benefit (on volunteer labor supply 
see e.g., Emrich and Pierdzioch 2015). 
The idea of looking at science and at scientists from an economic perspective is not new, alt-
hough the economic analysis of science is still relatively young (Stigler 1969). The transfer of 
economic methodology once again demonstrates the flexibility of the economic approach (for 





(as overviewed in Diamond 1996; Stephan 1996). Science can be understood as competition 
between individuals: “Scientific competition means competition within academic or open sci-
ence and its institutions: learned societies, scientific journals, the peer review system, Nobel 
prizes, and modern research-oriented universities” (Albert 2008). The economics of science are 
conceived as explanatory or “positive” science in order to give a better understanding of pro-
cesses and behaviors within academia (Diamond 1996). Accordingly, a scientist bases his or 
her decisions on the expected benefits and then compares it with the costs incurred (e.g. Wible 
2014; Emrich and Follert 2019a). Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that, due to 
the uncertainty inherent in every decision (fundamentally Knight 1921), the consequences may 
be misjudged (Kirchgässner 2013; Emrich and Follert 2019b). This is especially true in aca-
demic careers, in which a lot depends on random constellations (Weber 1930). Nevertheless, a 
scientist will acknowledge this uncertainty in order to try to improve his or her position and 
thus increase his or her benefit (e.g., Emrich and Follert 2019b). The individual benefit of a 
researcher may be expressed by rigor in terms of reputation, what is reflected by publications 
in renowned top scientific journals, citations in scientific journals (on the value of a citation 
Diamond 1986), invitations as speaker at conferences, and/or by relevance by mentions in 
newspapers or appearances on television, or even political influence (Emrich and Pitsch 2014)1.  
 
3 Decision Parameters 
3.1 Rigor versus Relevance 
Following Ludwig von Mises (1998), “human action is [always] purposeful behavior.” This 
also applies when information deficits and bounded rationality are taken into account (funda-
mentally Simon 1955, 1982). This axiom can also be applied to a scientist, who have to divide 
a scarce time budget according to research content and methods.2 In the scientific community, 
the distinction between the two antagonists, rigor and relevance, has been previously estab-
lished, especially for the applied sciences. While rigor in this case refers to scientific rigor, 
relevance regularly refers to the importance of the research for a particular addressee, so that a 
distinction can be made between scientific and practical relevance (Dilger 2012). For the pur-
pose of simplification, we would like to focus in the following on rigor and practical relevance 
in this paper. According to Dilger (2012) we understand rigor as “the very systematic and me-
thodical approach, the following of scientific rules and standards.” There seems to be a trade-
off between rigor and (practical) relevance (Nicolai 2004), so that in a society based on the 
division of labor, it is not surprising that specialization occurs within the scientific community 
(Dilger 2012). But a danger can be seen when rigor dominates one discipline (Dilger 2012). 
This is a problem in many disciplines, e.g. in economics as well as in business economics.  
In particular, after the recent international financial crisis, movements have formed worldwide 
that oppose research which is based on unrealistic assumptions and is exclusively quantitative-
                                                          
1 Depending on whether a scientist is more extrinsically or intrinsically motivated, he or she also benefits from 
his or her work: “Research is in many ways a kind of game, a puzzle-solving operation in which the solution of 
the puzzle is its own reward” (Hagstrom 1965).  
2 To reduce the complexity of our analysis and to concentrate on research we abstract here from administrative 





empirical oriented, and which is focused on only a small number of top journals (to this problem 
see e.g., Küting et al. 2013; Haucap and Mödl 2013; Kußmaul et al. 2017). Within the scientific 
community of business economics, especially in management science, the discussion about ri-
gor and relevance had already reached a peak in the early 2000s (e.g., Huff 2000; Rynes, 
Bartunek and Daft 2001; Nicolai 2004), and is still ongoing (e.g. Hamet and Michel 2018). 
In 2009 a dispute arose in the German economics community about the (methodological) ori-
entation of the discipline (Wilgeroth 2009; Bachmann and Uhlig 2009), with one side oriented 
towards economic policy in the sense of relevance and one, primarily internationally oriented 
side in the sense of rigor, which can be seen as “Neuer Methodenstreit” (e.g. Caspari and Sche-
fold 2011; Feld and Köhler 2011). 
The fact that the topic is also important for the broader economically interested public is shown 
by an article by Matthias Binswanger (2012, with 40,088 reads as of 3/31/20) on the German-
speaking blog “Ökonomenstimme”, in which he critically discusses the article by Edlund and 
Korn (2002) entitled “A Theory of Prostitution,” which was published in the Journal of Political 
Economy. In his critique, Binswanger follows Mankiw (2007):  
“[M]ore young economists today are doing Levitt-style economics and fewer are studying 
the classic questions of economic policy. That is disconcerting, to a degree. It could be 
especially problematic twenty years from now, when President Chelsea Clinton looks for 
an economist to appoint to head the Federal Reserve, and the only thing she can find in 
the American Economic Association are experts on game shows and sumo wrestling.”  
Concerning the discussion about rigor and relevance, however, it must be countered by the fact 
that practical relevance cannot be obtained solely by advising political decision-makers. Rele-
vance is primarily a subjective category, so that the demand of a broad public also leads to 
relevance (“public relevance”), which may lead to political relevance. The opposite case, in 
which political relevance encourages public relevance, is also conceivable. Although Steven 
Levitt does not research in areas that are (explicitly) relevant to economic policy, the worldwide 
success of his book Freakonomics, written together with Stephen Dubner (2005), shows that he 
is able to convey the economic approach to a broad public, which can by no means be dismissed 
as irrelevant. Therefore, relevance seems to exist both in the expression “political” and in the 
expression “public,” whereby it can be assumed that both expressions influence each other.  
 
3.2 Selection Mechanisms of Public, Politics, and Science 
Scientific findings presented by economists are always related to a specific historical point in 
time that is more or less connectable to the criteria of rigor and public or political relevance. 
While the criteria for rigor are generally an outcome of a negotiation of processes within the 
scientific community, concrete public interests form the demand from politics and the specific 
public for the respective results. 
Rigor can be understood as a concrete form within the framework of a particular style of think-
ing (Fleck 1980), a paradigm (Kuhn 1976), or a research program (Lakatos 1970), which has 





characteristics are used to assess knowledge gains. The disregard of rigor or the deliberate de-
viation from it is connected with a high risk of rejection or disregard of the presented knowledge 
in the scientific community. At the same time, for example, the acceptance of a journal article 
that does not comply with rigor by a reviewer is also associated with kind of risks for the re-
viewer,3 but at least with increased effort for the reviewer (Haucap and Mödl 2013). Over time, 
this development converges to a high degree of standardization and typification, with a decrease 
in originality and research diversity (e.g. Frey 2011). Frey and Osterloh (2020) call the problem 
within a peer-review as  
“conservative bias, that is the bias against unconventional ideas. Referees subjectively 
have more information on research projects that are close to existing knowledge. Moreo-
ver, information on those contributions is more consistent. With unorthodox contributions 
referees have less – and usually inconsistent – information.”   
The importance of scientific findings for political and administrative decision-makers lies on 
the one hand in the acquisition of control knowledge, and on the other hand in the production 
of legitimacy for decisions. Both can occur either coupled or decoupled with each other. Thus, 
it is conceivable that control knowledge is adapted from scientific knowledge without referring 
to the production of legitimacy by explicitly referring to the origin of the knowledge from the 
scientific system. As Max Weber (1958) has already pointed out, the separation of specialized 
expertise and political decision-making power is by no means unproblematic. This appears to 
have been the case, for example, in the context of nudging (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Schnel-
lenbach 2016) and the establishment of corresponding experts in governmental centers in the 
UK, the US and Germany (Dams et al. 2015; see also Bundesregierung 2019). Several countries 
have written guidelines for scientific policy advice (Mayntz 2009). The market for political 
consulting is being worked on intensively. On the supply side, there are ministerial advisers ( 
e.g. Maley 2010), (private) consulting firms, NGOs, think tanks, and lobbyists on the one hand 
(e.g. Howlett and Migone 2017), and scientific policy advisors on the other, who may be pri-
vately or publicly funded (e.g. Mayntz 2009). Such approaches to the incorporation of experts 
on new scientific findings that are relevant to control ultimately accumulate over time in a so-
called departmental research (“Ressortforschung”). This refers to subordinate authorities whose 
task it is to work on politically relevant issues using established scientific theories and methods. 
From time to time, the scope of action of such authorities is extended by a budget for contract 
research, which enables the tendering of specific research projects. Such calls signal political 
relevance for the topic in question to scientists who are free to decide on funding. A general 
problem of scientific policy advice is the conflict between facts and power (“Sachbezug” and 
“Machtbezug”, Mayntz 2009).  
                                                          
3 One of the risks is, that the article does not represent the reviewer’s scientific position. To maximize his own 
utility, he has strong incentives to support his own point of view and to reject others. Towards the characteristics 
and problems of the scientific (peer) review system, particularly concerning status differences between reviewer 
and other and the influence on the results of the review process see Zuckerman and Merton (1971) who differen-
tiate between “status-solidarity”, “status-competition”, “status-deference”, “status-envy”, “status-patronage” 





The link between the acquisition of control knowledge and the pursuit of legitimacy is estab-
lished when political decision-makers refer to scientific evidence when announcing or explain-
ing their decisions. In most cases, this legitimacy production takes place in a personalized form, 
i.e., a specific scientist a or small group is used as evidence for the assumptions of impact 
associated with the political decision. The suitability as a “supplier of legitimacy” depends, 
among other things, on the perceived independence of the scientist from the interests of third 
parties, and ultimately on his or her commitment to the ethos of science and the associated 
CUDOS norms (Merton 1985). The instrumentalization of scientific findings in the course of 
the production of political legitimacy can also lead, due to the polarization between the govern-
ing parties and the opposition parties, to the legitimization of other control proposals with other 
experts, and thus to the start of a politicization spiral of the scientists who generate legitimacy.  
This mutually relationship between science and politics is currently evident due to the COVID-
19 crisis. There seems to be a broad scientific, political and generally accepted consensus 
reached on the assumptions that some intervention must be taken, to slow down the spreading 
of infections. But each country takes different actions, because this pandemic is completely new 
and there is little empirical evidence. As a result of this uncertainty the assessments concerning 
the most effective actions differ, because even in natural sciences, the interpretation of empiri-
cal findings depends on (subjective) preferences and assumptions. Spoken with Ludwik Fleck 
(1980), scientific findings follow a social conditionality. In Sweden, for example, esp. Anders 
Tegnell advises the government as an epidemiologist and this appeals to a common sense to 
issue recommendations instead of strict prohibitions. In the UK and the Netherlands, so-called 
“herd immunity” was initially pursued, but its supporters have been heavily criticized, so that 
they adjusted their strategies, but not quite strictly. Deviating from these rather laissez-fair 
measures, there are countries like Spain and Italy that early adopted very strict restrictions on 
the advice of their leading scientists (example). In Germany, Christian Drosten, Alexander Ke-
kulé, and Hendrik Streeck seems to be the scientists that get the most public attention. In a 
situation characterized by uncertainty such as the current one, political actors seek the advice 
from scientific experts. Two aspects should be pointed out in this context. On the one hand, it 
should be emphasized that, in Max Weber's sense, scientists do not set normative goals them-
selves and thus leave all political decisions to the elected representatives. On the other hand, it 
should also be pointed out that there is a possible danger that leading scientists could be politi-
cally instrumentalized to underline political wishful thinking with scientific reputation.  
Obviously, in the current pandemic there is a trade-off between the goal “Protection against 
infection” and those effects that results by actions to realize that goal, e.g., negative economic, 
social or mental (what of course is a medical aspect as well) effects. From a theoretical per-
spective, an optimum can be found where the marginal utility of the actions to contain infections 
correspond the marginal costs. The individual weighting within the target function is a norma-
tive decision and is not answerable by science. In particular, a constructive debate about the 
pros and cons is required to balance these conflicting goals. What we can also learn from the 
current situation is, that an actual optimum can only be found if an interdisciplinary approach 
is followed (Follert 2020). Consequently, the scientists consulted for policy advice must focus 
different aspects: In addition to virologists who primarily pursue health protection, economists, 





At this point, we can remark that scholars can achieve public attention or even relevance 
through their role as producers of legitimacy for political decisions. It should be noted that the 
individual legitimacy resources do not seem to be infinite, and must be replenished by a return 
to scientific rigor and originality, although this can also be done by colleagues within the same 
institution. This would also explain the divergence between international top-level research and 
policy advisory within economics (Haucap and Mödl 2013). However, scientists can also gain 
public attention by translating complex problems into a broadly understandable form (e.g. the 
works of Stephen Hawking) or by applying scientific models to interesting everyday phenom-
ena (e.g. Becker and Nashat Becker 1997; Levitt and Dubner 2005; Kahneman 2011) in an 
entertaining way.  
 
4 Modelling Scientific Decision-Making 
In economics, life cycles are often assumed, for example for products or business enterprises 
(e.g. Mueller 1972; Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Klepper 1996). On this research we build 
a career cycle for the professional life of a scientist. To reduce the complexity of our analysis, 
we assume three stereotypical phases: 
(I) Core research: This first phase is characterized through the subject area in which the 
researcher engages in scientific discourse through his own publications. Here he or she 
produces knowledge and can achieve rigor and/or relevance within a limited scientific 
community.  
(II) Discipline: After building a certain reputation within his core research the contributions 
to subject areas that follow his or her field of research, but which he or she has not 
worked on. He or she extends the area but still remains within the overall discipline. 
Here the scientist can achieve relevance, but does not produce knowledge and cannot 
achieve rigor in his core research. 
(III) Non-specialist: The consumption in III requires prior investments in I and II. In partic-
ular, a minimum level of activity in the scientists’ core research area is necessary. In 
this phase, the subject does not have any relation to the scientist’s discipline.4 When the 
scientist comments on those topics, he or she produces neither knowledge nor rigor nor 
relevance as a scientist. Nevertheless, he or she (as an individual) can attain political or 
public relevance, e.g., on social media channels. We can assume that this should be 
easier for a well-established scientist, because the legitimacy produced by the CUDOS 
norms as a member of the scientific community is transferred to the other (external) 
subject area. However, if an abuse of the role as a scientist for this (III) subject area is 
recognized by the public, this reduces c.p. the effect of CUDOS legitimacy as a scientist 
in the successor period. By obtaining academic degrees and titles, the position can be 
strategically expanded so that public credibility increases. Whether the individual ex-
ploits the possibilities gained in phase III depends on his or her personal preference, e.g. 
whether he or she attaches importance to being in the public. 
                                                          





In phase I, relevance is limited to a small scientific community. However, if political or public 
relevance is sought and it is expected by the scientist that this cannot be achieved with the core 
research, he or she decides to make contributions on areas that lie outside the core research field 
(phase II) as well. For the scientist, it may be necessary to invest again in rigor and scientific 
relevance in this new field of research. This new field is not aligned at gain in knowledge or 
rigor, but at achieving political or public relevance, which is needed for phase III. With Bour-
dieu one could argue that knowledge, rigor and academic relevance as places of capital can only 
be exchanged for public or political relevance as another place of capital once a certain mini-
mum level of resources has been reached. Consequently, phase II could be interpreted as the 
phase in which the connectivity to political and/or public relevance is established. Scientists 
without a preference for political or public relevance have chosen their topics according to other 
preferences. But, scientists with preferences for public/political relevance will choose their top-
ics in the way they think they will become "relevant". 
To illustrate our ideal-typical phase-model graphically, we built on the common approach of a 
product life cycle, see Figure 1. In the actual core research area, additional gain in knowledge 
and reputation can only be gained if the resource consumption is high (decreasing marginal 
utility). The scientist recycles his or her own ideas, which have reached the maximum of the 
life cycle. If necessary, the scientist even fears a decline in reputation. In order to develop fur-
ther, the scientist moves on to phase II and expands his or her research area. Once the optimum 
is reached in phase II, the scientist begins to invest resources in phase III.   
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Since scientists are also subject to the law of scarcity, they must choose between various alter-
natives. Our model to explain the decision-making behavior of a stereotypical scientist assumes 
an individual who maximizes his or her expected utility in accordance with his or her inter-
temporally stable utility function, or strives to do so under incomplete information and uncer-
tainty. For the scientist, it is therefore a matter of maximizing the allocation of his or her time 
budget for different scientific activities in accordance with his or her utility function, which can 
provide him or her with different anticipated consumption benefits.5 
Emrich and Pitsch (2014) apply the religious-economic household models of Becker (1965) 
and Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) to sports science, distinguishing the consumption of a scientist 
into internal (Ci) and external (Ce) recognition (Emrich and Pitsch 2014), presenting a model 
that we now use as a proxy for rigor and relevance.6 The scientist thus maximizes his inter-
temporal utility U of the following function (for the basic model, see Emrich and Pitsch 2014): 
U = U(Ci + Ce)  (1) 
Of course, it is important to optimize its benefits over time. For this purpose, the costs (CO) of 




t=0  – ∑ COt(1+δ)tnt=0 ); with 𝛿 as discount rate > 0 (2) 
Since a researcher’s academic reputation (Emrich and Pitsch 2014; in the context of entrepre-
neurship theory, e.g. Gerbaulet 2016) is the decisive factor for career opportunities, and repre-
sents the crucial currency, it directly determines the decision-making calculation (e.g. Emrich 
and Follert 2019a). The reputation of a researcher is not a static quantity, but rather a dynamic 
one, which depends in particular on past reputation, academic background in the sense of social 
networks, and publication activity (for a satirical formalization in the context of the “PARK 
model,” see Emrich and Pierdzioch 2011). The determinants “past reputation” and “academic 
background” favor a “Matthew effect”, so that once a certain success has been achieved, the 
current success can be attributed more to previous success (Merton 1968). In addition to these 
non-financial flows of benefits, financial benefits can also of course play a role, although this 
benefit component is likely to tend to be less important, especially for state universities in Ger-
man-speaking countries and the fixed part of the remuneration. However, since financial incen-
tives and other influencing factors cannot be completely neglected, they should be expressed 
using a confounder e. Variable earnings can be understood as a function of reputation, so that 
they often increase in the course of a career.7 Total consumption C is dependent on the total 
time T available for consumption purposes (for the theory of the allocation of time, fundamen-
tally, see Becker 1965), which results from individual weighting, based on the subjective pref-
erences. We assume a stereotypical scientist who has to allocate his scarce time budget on ac-
tivities that produce Ci and/or Ce.  
                                                          
5 Another assumption is that the scientist considered here is already established within the scientific community, 
so that his initial investment can be neglected. Ideally, the model is considered for a full-professor. 
6 It should be noted that the scientist can of course also be interested only in gaining knowledge (“motive of 
salvation,” Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Emrich and Pitsch 2014), but he must also live “from science” (Emrich and 
Pitsch 2014) (“motive of consumption,” Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Emrich and Pitsch 2014), so that the motive of 
consumption regularly precedes the motive of salvation. 





The individual weighting of Ci and Ce depends on the respective target function of the scientist.  
The researcher's time budget can be defined as: 
 t  = 24 h – t   (3) 
with  t  = leisure time; t  = research time   
tCi(w)  = w ∙ t ,   (4) 
with t  = time budget for Ci   
tCe(w) = (1 – w) ∙ t    (5) 
with t  = time budget for Ce  
C(w) = w ∙ Ci + (1 – w) ∙ Ce + e  (6) 
with e = other influencing factors 
To receive the total consumption, the scientist has to carry out an intrinsic weighting of Ci and 
Ce. The variables rigor (RI) and relevance (RE) – outlined above – as well as the preferred level 
of gain in knowledge (K), so that the weighting can be written as a function of those variables. 
w = w(RI, RE, K) (7) 
Therefore, the height of w follows from the individual preference for RE, RI and K. This con-
nection can be described as follows:  
       The more important RI, the higher w. 
       The more important RE, the lower w. 
       The more important K, the higher w.  
The individual preference for RE, RI and K is, of course, a dynamic variable, which the re-
searcher particularly makes depending on the respective phase (I, II, III). For example, if the 
researcher primarily aims for external reputation in phase III, he will consider RI and K as 
unimportant and RE as very important. As a result, he will choose w as low as possible and 
consequently maximize Ce. 
The researcher must allocate the time budget on his or her internal and external consumption. 
He or she divides the time on the basis of a personal weighting, which will mostly shift signif-
icantly during his or her career cycle. While the weighting of internal consumption will inevi-
tably predominate at the beginning of the career, the importance shifts more and more to exter-
nal consumption with increasing reputation and thus additional work by the own team and other 





the COVID-19 infection fatality rate, was published by 22 authors, while Hendrik Streeck is 
the scientist that is well-known from talk-shows and newspapers.  
We have to acknowledge that investments to gain knowledge, rigor, and relevance are not dis-
junctive. For example, a unit of time invested to gain knowledge may also partially benefit 
rigor, relevance, or both. 
If one illustrates this in a VENN diagram, it becomes clear that by considering the size of the 
overlapping areas α, β, γ, and δ as prototypes for the decision situations of scientists in the 
choice of their research object, the optimization function according to the individual preferences 
of the choosing scientists can be derived (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2: Investments in RI, RE, K 
 
With respect to the individual nature of human beings, scientists also have different preferences. 
A scientist with a strong preference for relevance will therefore choose research topics that 
maximize the sum of β, γ, and δ. A preference for rigor will maximize the sum of α, γ, and δ. 
In both cases, δ decreases, which is in line with the findings of Haucap and Mödl (2013). A 
scientist who is only oriented on gaining knowledge will sometimes achieve more rigor, some-
times more relevance, and sometimes neither of the two with his research results. His internal 
(Ci) and external (Ce) recognition (Emrich and Pitsch 2014) are likely to be systematically lower 
than that of scientists with a higher preference for rigor or relevance, due to the randomness of 
meeting rigor or relevance with the knowledge gained. Since the academic market is a form of 
“winner-take-all” competition (Stephan 1996), following Feld, Necker, and Frey (2015, funda-
mentally Frank and Cook 1995), the group of scientists appointed to relevant chairs should be 
more likely to include researchers with a clear preference for rigor or relevance. However, since 
the assignment of rigor and relevance are also winner-take-all markets, these produce a rela-












For them, the opportunity costs of spending time outside of science would decrease, leading to 
less time spent inside science, and also to a reduction in the number of research objects pro-
cessed. This should primarily affect research objects for which a high degree of connectivity to 
rigor or relevance was originally anticipated. At the collective level, this weakens the orienta-
tion towards rigor and relevance as criteria for the selection of research objects, which leads to 
an approximation to the ethos of science, and stabilizes it. 
If one follows our model and accepts that  
 neither rigor nor relevance as a scientist can be achieved without substantial gain in 
knowledge, and 
 public or political relevance can be promoted through rigor, 
then it would be advisable for young scientists to allocate their time on rigor, regardless of their 
individual preferences. If the young researcher has established himself or herself, for example, 
by being appointed to a (full) professorship, he or she can shift the focus of his or her research 
topics according to his or her concrete preferences toward relevance or pure knowledge gain, 
or maintain the focus on rigor. If it becomes clear that the selected research topics do not fulfil 
the expected benefits over the course of time, which were considered in the decision-making 
process, this leads to a reduction in the amount of time invested in research, as well as the 
relative strengthening of research for the purpose of a pure gain in knowledge.  
 
5 Concluding Remarks and Outlook 
Science plays an extremely important role in modern society, and is also one of the primary 
drivers of growth. Because of their scarce time budget of 24/7, scientists have to choose be-
tween different alternatives in how to spend their time. By valuing their preferences, they have 
to consider several interdependencies between their orientation concerning content and meth-
ods, which we summarize as a decision between rigor and relevance and the perception in me-
dia, politics, and the scientific community. We explain the decision of a stereotypical individual 
researcher by developing a simple model that builds on the rational choice approach, in partic-
ular on Schumpeter’s methodological individualism and Becker’s utility maximizing man that 
has been adopted to the economics of science. For further research, we see four especially im-
portant pathways: 
1. The model that we suggest could be tested empirically by future research in order to 
gain more knowledge on the individual behaviors of modern scientists. In particular, 
these findings could be compared to the traditional understanding of scientists that is 
proposed by Merton (1985). In this context, Sztompka (2007) notes that the scientific 
ideal type is threatened by an increasing instrumentalization of scientific knowledge, 
financial pressures, and dependencies.  
2. In our analysis, we focus on the current conditions within a scientific system that is 
characterized by external incentives. One aspect that could be reflected in future re-
search is the individual well-being of the scientists. Feld, Necker, and Frey (2015) found 





by publishing a paper in one of the top journals. They show that spending more time on 
research is more important for the well-being of the economists, which is in line with 
the intrinsic motivation by “solving a puzzle” (Feld, Necker, and Frey 2015) or to “hunt 
myths” (Elias 2014). Following the “crowding out” approach by Deci (1971) or Frey 
(1994), the pressure to publish in the top journals could have a contrary effect. 
3. A gain in scientific knowledge is a public good – especially in times of internet and 
open access, SSRN, ResearchGate, etc. – which is primarily produced in institutions 
financed by taxes. To this extent, it has no market price, which results from supply and 
demand, and is a first indication of the value of market participants. However, research 
in the field of public goods has developed various methods that allow valuation, at least 
heuristically (e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). With regard to the economics of well-
being, the life satisfaction approach appears to be particularly promising (e.g., Frey, 
Luechinger and Stutzer 2009), so that future research could address the empirical value 
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